Under the Danish EU Presidency, chat control is back on the agenda, posing yet another threat to our fundamental digital rights. What is being sold as a well-intentioned law against child sexual abuse and the distribution of related images and videos (CSAM) actually threatens to surveil our communications and undermine data protection and privacy.
While many believed that the draft law had been shelved, similar proposals are repeatedly being put forward and are, in fact, still relevant. Even though the latest attempt appears to have been halted due to massive public pressure, further resistance is still crucial today. This is because even ‘voluntary monitoring’ of chats by chat service providers can pose a threat to pluralistic expression of opinion and place parts of civil society under general suspicion, or at least give people the feeling of being under surveillance, leading to so-called ‘chilling effects’. [1, 2]
What does >Chat Control mean for all of us?
But let’s go back to the beginning! The term ‘chat control’ refers to a draft law proposed by the European Commission in May 2022 that aims to systematically screen all private messages, including chats, emails and messenger communications, for suspicious content. [3]
This means that providers of messenger or email services are obliged to scan content in some form or at least set up interfaces, even in the case of end-to-end encryption (E2EE). [3]
To this end, so-called ‘client-side scanning’ (CSS) is to be used, whereby the content on our end devices is checked before encryption, which effectively negates the security of the encryption. After all, the whole point of E2EE is that only the sender and recipient can read the content of a message. The installation of CSS would therefore enable third parties (in this case, the security authorities) to ‘read’ parts of the message content. [3]
The argument put forward by proponents focuses solely on child abuse content, or CSAM, but technically speaking, it is possible to monitor arbitrary topics. In addition, in order to check for prohibited content, every single message must be analysed and compared, regardless of who sent it and what it contains. [3]
Another problem is that no judicial authorisation is required, meaning that private chats can be scanned without any suspicion whatsoever, which could have a massive impact on the strength of our judiciary and the rule of law. [3]
What are the main arguments of proponents?
1. Protection of children from sexual abuse
The EU Commission emphasises that millions of images and videos depicting sexualised violence against children circulate online every day. This content would be shared via messaging services and cloud platforms. Without technical monitoring, it would be impossible to track down perpetrators or identify victims. Chat control is intended to help detect and deter this abuse at an early stage.
However: No one is undermining the goal of protecting children. But mass surveillance is not an effective means of doing so. Abuse often occurs in closed, non-public channels or offline environments. Unfortunately, it often even occurs in private and family settings. Perpetrators quickly adapt to new technologies, while innocent citizens come under general suspicion. In addition, there are already specialised investigative authorities and targeted measures to punish or even prevent child abuse. Unwarranted scans would lead to an impenetrable wealth of data in which investigators would be searching for the proverbial needle in a haystack without being able to focus on truly suspicious cases. [3, 4]
2. Chat control is not an invasion of privacy, but targeted investigation
Proponents say that this is not about mass surveillance, but rather targeted analysis with technical safeguards. Content would only be reported if it matches abuse databases or exhibits certain behaviour patterns.
However: This is a rhetorical reinterpretation. In order to determine whether a message is ‘suspicious’ in the first place, it must first be scanned, and this applies to all of us. By definition, this constitutes comprehensive surveillance. A ‘targeted’ intervention would only be possible if there were prior suspicion. That is not the case here. The law thus violates the fundamental right to privacy and the presumption of innocence. [3, 5]
3. National security authorities support the project
Several interior ministries argue that chat control would make investigative work considerably easier and improve the preservation of evidence. Encrypted communication in particular currently makes it difficult to solve serious crimes. This argument goes hand in hand with the general arguments in favour of source telecommunications surveillance and state surveillance.
However: Security agencies already have tools at their disposal to conduct targeted investigations, including judicial authorisations for surveillance in cases of concrete suspicion. Chat control, on the other hand, undermines the principle of targeted access and replaces it with blanket surveillance. This turns the state of emergency into the norm. It also jeopardises the work of journalists, lawyers and whistleblowers who rely on confidential communication. [3, 5]
4. Without chat control, the EU remains incapable of acting
The EU needs a common legal basis to combat abuse material across borders. National solo efforts are ineffective.
However: Joint strategies make sense, but not at the expense of fundamental rights. Instead, the EU could invest in investigative cooperation, prevention programmes, training and victim protection. A Europe-wide surveillance infrastructure creates uniformity, but in the wrong direction: it jeopardises the security of all communication systems and weakens trust in digital services. [3]
Why the topic is relevant again now
After massive public pressure and a period of relative silence, the project has been gaining momentum again since autumn 2025. Research by TechRadar and other media outlets shows that some EU member states now support the draft – explicitly including the option to scan encrypted chats. The Danish government had set itself the goal of reaching an agreement in the Council during its current presidency. [6, 7]
Even though the vote failed due to massive public pressure (or rather, was not even put to a vote), this clearly shows that there is a significant number of states and political groups in Europe that are not averse to the basic idea. [7]
Germany has stated that it will not approve the proposal in its current form, although there are some supporters of chat control within the German government. However, even without German approval, a qualified majority in the EU Council could pass the law. Data protectionists, IT security researchers and civil rights organisations have been warning for months that this would set a precedent: once encryption is weakened, there is no turning back. [6, 7]
That is why the issue needs to be revisited. Anyone who believes that the idea of chat control has failed is mistaken. [8]
Why public pressure is effective
Political processes respond to public opinion. The history of internet policy has demonstrated this time and again. Upload filters, data retention and other invasions of privacy – all these projects were only stopped or at least watered down when the protests became loud enough. Chat control is not purely a technical legislative project, but a power project. It aims to gain control over communication, and this can only be prevented if society and the media pay attention. [7, 8]
Civil pressure works because it increases the cost of political decisions. When citizens visibly disagree, when journalists, scientists and activists raise awareness, then an issue becomes uncomfortable. Then ministries and MPs have to take a stand. That is exactly what is happening right now: just because people take to the streets, write emails to MPs or publish articles, the issue remains in the public eye, and that is the only way to prevent it from being waved through in Brussels, Berlin or wherever else in the EU. [8]
Final personal remarks
Apart from the pros and cons mentioned above, we must realise that even if we trust our current governments not to exceed certain limits of mass surveillance despite their legal powers, the situation could be very different under a future (possibly more authoritarian or even fascist) government.
Once powers of indiscriminate surveillance are granted, they open the floodgates to all kinds of authoritarian control of government critics, minorities, etc. At a time of strong political polarisation and the rise of extremist forces, introducing mass surveillance without cause under the pretext of child protection is not only negligent, but potentially dangerous for all of us in society as a whole, as well as for each and every one of us privately – perhaps not today or tomorrow, but we are taking a gamble whose risk we cannot and should not bear.
Sources
- Proschofsky, A. (2025): EU-Ratspräsidentschaft gibt überraschend Pläne für Chatkontrolle auf. URL: https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000294432/eu-ratspraesidentschaft-gibt-ueberraschend-plaene-fuer-chatkontrolle-auf
- Bergt, S. (2025): Freiwillige Kontrolle? URL: https://taz.de/Chatkontrolle-Vorschlag/!6125842/
- Reuter, M. (2025): Warum ist Chatkontrolle so gefährlich für uns alle? URL: https://netzpolitik.org/2025/fragen-und-antworten-warum-ist-chatkontrolle-so-gefaehrlich-fuer-uns-alle/
- Reuter, M. (2025): Kinderschutzbund stellt sich gegen Chatkontrolle. URL: https://netzpolitik.org/2025/eu-ueberwachungsgesetz-kinderschutzbund-stellt-sich-gegen-chatkontrolle/
- Reuter, M. (2025): Die Chatkontrolle gefährdet die Demokratie. URL: https://netzpolitik.org/2025/eu-ueberwachungsplaene-die-chatkontrolle-gefaehrdet-die-demokratie/
- Castro, C. (2025): The vote on Chat Control has been postponed, but the “fight isn’t over” yet – here’s what we know. URL: https://www.techradar.com/vpn/vpn-privacy-security/the-vote-on-chat-control-has-been-postponed-but-the-fight-isnt-over-yet-heres-what-we-know
- Reuter, M. (2025): Bundesregierung ist gegen „anlasslose Chatkontrolle“. URL: https://netzpolitik.org/2025/protest-wirkt-bundesregierung-ist-gegen-anlasslose-chatkontrolle/
- Reuter, M. (2025): Dänischer Justizminister diskreditiert Chatkontrolle-Proteste. URL: https://netzpolitik.org/2025/absurd-und-respektlos-daenischer-justizminister-diskreditiert-chatkontrolle-proteste/
- Meister, A. (2025): Dänemark nimmt Abstand von verpflichtender Chatkontrolle. URL: https://netzpolitik.org/2025/etappensieg-daenemark-nimmt-abstand-von-verpflichtender-chatkontrolle/